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Abstract: We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption
and the exploitation of natural resources. The first is conceptual. Studies that use
national level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many forms, at
multiple levels, and may or may not affect resource use. Without a clear causal model of
the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any
estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources. The second
problem is methodological: Simple models linking corruption measures and natural
resource use typically do not account for other important causes and control variables
pivotal to the relationship between humans and natural resources. By way of illustration
of these two general concerns, we demonstrate that the findings of a well known recent
study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests, elephants, and
rhinoceros are fragile to simple conceptual and methodological refinements.
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The complex links between governance and biodiversity
Introduction
The importance of government corruption as an explanation for environmental
degradation gained popularity with the drastic decline of forests and certain species of
wildlife in the 1970s and 80s (e.g. Myers 1979; Hecht & Cockburn 1989; Gibson 1999;
Ross 2001). Indeed, it seems only commonsensical that politicians and officials with
short time horizons and few legal checks on their power are likely to augment their
wealth (and the wealth of their supporters) by supporting the over-harvesting of natural
resources such as forests and wild animals. It appears self-evident that corrupt politicians
and bureaucrats in developing countries play a nontrivial role in environmental
degradation.

An increasing number of studies thus seek to make generalizable claims about this
connection between corruption and environmental outcomes by testing hypotheses with
cross national data. Exploiting relatively new data sets that offer measures related to
government quality, some analysts have found significant relationships between proxies
for corruption and resource outcomes. One of the most recent studies is Smith et al.’s
(2003) analysis in Nature that finds strong relationships between corruption and the
decline of elephant, rhinoceros, and forests. Their results add empirical plausibility to
arguments directly linking corruption and biodiversity loss.

But the relationship between corruption and natural resources is far more complex than is
captured in current work and this complexity may be lost in attempts at simple
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generalizations. For example, countries practicing “good governance” may also
overexploit resources. Where poverty is widespread and the population uniformly prefers
to degrade resources in order to bolster current consumption, an honest, responsive, and
representative government may advance policies that run counter to conservation goals.
Moreover, corruption can appear at different levels of government, whereas the available
indices of government performance and quality are only measured at the national level.
We have worked in tropical countries whose central governments have a reputation for
relatively low levels of corruption, yet in remote regions local officials contribute
demonstrably to habitat and biodiversity loss. Finally, not all forms of corruption lead to
overexploitation. Wanton nepotism in a government does not necessarily lead to assaults
on biodiversity; neither does the stealing of tax monies, the extraction of bribes at
customs booths, etc. Countries with such characteristics may be ranked as corrupt, but
such corruption may have little to do with the natural resources. The links between
politics and environmental outcomes, therefore, are unlikely to be captured well by
simple models and inappropriate statistical tests.

In this brief essay, we explore two fundamental issues about cross-national studies
attempting to link corruption and environmental outcomes. The first is conceptual, and
turns on how corruption is used to infer causality. Corruption and environmental
outcomes are commonly both the result of sets of political and economic institutions at
different levels that are weak or missing (Barrett et al. 2001). Consequently, corruption
and natural resources might be related, but not in the causal ways commonly posited in
simple models. For example, weakness in enforcing rules even at the community level
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can foster both corruption and overexploitation of natural resources (Gibson, Ostrom &
Williams 2005). Inference with respect to the relationship between corruption and
conservation requires far more nuance than commonly appears in published studies.

The second fundamental issue relates to the statistical methods appropriate to testing
hypotheses using cross-national data. Methodological weaknesses in such analyses –
incomplete data, improper research designs, and inadequate tests – often lead to invalid
conclusions about how corruption may influence the stocks of forests, elephant, and
rhinoceros. Such concerns are familiar to social scientists, e.g., from the extensive
literature on economic growth based on cross-country regressions (Barro 1997; Durlauf
& Quah 1999), but perhaps less mainstream within conservation science, although a large
number of economic studies of tropical deforestation with relatively sophisticated
methods have existed since the late 1980s (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998). While an
understanding of how politics – like corruption – affect resource outcomes is surely
required for better policymaking, simple causal models may at best be misleading, and at
worst counterproductive.

To explore these two issues, we use the prominent Smith et al. (2003) study as a foil to
unpack the important issues that analysts need to address when seeking to explain the
links between corruption and outcomes on the landscape. Smith et al.’s study uses
national level indicators of corruption and biodiversity in a cross national design, and find
that there are significant and negative relationships between the two.
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Explaining the Links between Corruption and Natural Resources
There is growing interest in the effect of government quality on economic, political and
environmental outcomes. It is widely accepted that governments that are less corrupt and
that have more efficient bureaucracies – i.e., have better “governance” – produce more
effective policy (Tendler 1997). Indeed several policies emanating from donors,
watchdog non-governmental organizations and trade groups seek to incorporate explicitly
measures to foment the better governance of forest resources, for example Transparency
International’s Forest Integrity Network, the International Tropical Timber
Organization’s policy forum on criminal activity in the forest sector, the U.S.
Government’s Congo Basin Initiative, and the Center for International Forestry
Research’s newly-created forest governance division. The World Bank also emphasizes
the role of good governance within its forest sector strategy as well as more broadly in its
poverty reduction programs. The objective of checking the abuse of power by officials is
laudable. And the United States’s Millennium Challenge account is beginning to link the
process of good government with environmental measures in deciding how to allocate its
portfolio of foreign aid.

But what are we talking about when speak of corruption? Are these “bad” officials
politicians, bureaucrats, some combination of the foregoing groups, or something else?
Do the bad officials occupy national, regional, or local offices? In a recent summary of
lessons learned in natural resource conservation activities in Africa, the United States
Agency for International Development (2002) emphasizes the importance of good
governance at the local level. Yet most studies of corruption use national level indicators
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since they are compiled by organizations concerned largely with central government
functioning (often relation to urban-based commerce and multinational agencies). The
potential mismatch of actors and scales of analysis should be cause for concern. Further,
do all of these officials have the same amount of power to affect resource stocks? Does
the nature of the laws of a country, or even its physical characteristics facilitate
corruption? Given all the possible sub national variation, a single measure of corruption
at the national level seems highly unlikely to capture the true relationship between
corruption and resource outcomes.

Empirical research using cross-country data to explore the government-related causes of
deforestation in particular has grown rapidly since the early 1990s. Earlier case study
research found that weak property rights were associated with loss of forest cover (Gillis
1980; Repetto & Gillis 1988; Vincent 1990; Southgate et al. 1991; Alston et al. 1996;
Godoy et al. 1996; Pinchon 1997). Using panel data, cross national studies substantiated
this claim (Deacon 1994, 1999; Bohn & Deacon 2000). These studies did not measure
corruption per se, but rather factors directly affected by governments that might affect
forests.

However, modeling the relationship between forests and an attribute of a government at
the national level – like corruption – rather than a policy output – like property rights – is
a far more difficult endeavor. Attributes may or may not affect any single policy area: a
corrupt government may be less corrupt in one sector -- or at one level -- than another.
More importantly, attributes do not reveal the mechanism by which it becomes
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observable on the forest. There are dozens of strategies through which officials can
transfer the benefits of natural resources from the state to themselves, i.e., act corruptly
(Callister 1992; Contreras-Hermosilla 1997; de Bohan et al. 1996; Krishnaswamy &
Hanson 1999). Politicians and bureaucrats can sell or exchange the resource; give
permits to friends, family, and political supporters; cut off a person’s legal right to a
resource; and intentionally under-enforce laws that conserve resources (Ascher 1999).
Further, a corrupt action may have the same observable effect on a forest as an honest
action: intentional under-enforcement due to corruption may have the same outcome on
a resource as unintentional under- enforcement due to lack of government resources, i.e.
in both cases lots of trees may be cut or elephants killed. Thus any theory about the
connection between corrupt behavior and resource outcome needs to specify the causal
mechanism(s) precisely in order to test the causal mechanism of the hypothesized
relationship if empirical results are to lead to robust findings. Simple correlation tests
between two variables measured at the national level will be hard pressed to capture these
different mechanisms.

In trying to account for the mechanism by which corruption causes changes in
biodiversity, Smith et al. (2003) offer four reasons to expect that corrupt officials subvert
conservation: conservation project funding is easy to misappropriate, bribery is common,
conservation departments have little enforcement capability, and oversight is difficult.
These are all plausible theories, and each may indeed be associated with a different,
malfunctioning set of institutions. But the authors neither specify nor test these
arguments. Instead, they employ correlation and regression analysis to test the
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association between governance and standard national level measures of human welfare.
As we demonstrate in the next section, these sorts of ad hoc empirical specifications are
not robust to even modest adjustments through the incorporation of additional
observations or other plausible explanatory variables. As a result of the absence of
clearly articulated and directly tested causal channels and the fragility of the resulting
statistical findings, it becomes difficult to know what to make of results purporting to link
corruption causally to conservation outcomes.

Testing for corruption
Even disregarding the conceptual problems of these approaches, tests such as Smith et
al.’s offer few grounds to be persuaded that national level measures of governance have
any robust relationship with environmental outcomes. In their investigation of forests,
for example, Smith et al. use two different dependent variables, change in total forest
cover and change in natural forest cover from 1990 to 1995, to estimate the correlations
between forests and governance. The authors compute bivariate Spearman correlation
coefficients of change in forest cover on the means of national governance scores (on
which, more below), per capita gross domestic product (GDP), Human Development
Index (HDI) score, and population density. They find that change in total forest cover
correlates positively with per capita GDP and governance, but change in natural forest
cover does not correlate with governance. The authors therefore suggest that the “result
for total cover was driven by the establishment of new plantations in wealthier, bettergoverned countries” (p.68).
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These conclusions are not robust. Simple and desirable changes to the statistical methods
used completely change their outcomes. First, if we are to isolate the effect of corruption
on forest cover across countries, a test must control for change in other variables that are
likely to be correlated with both corruption and forest cover. Second, the comparison of
natural and total forest covers is simply invalid because it uses different samples. The
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports forest cover for all
countries, but reports natural forest cover only for developing nations. Thus a correct test
of the difference between determinants of natural forest cover versus total forest cover
must restrict the total forest cover to developing countries. Otherwise the results may
simply reflect different samples. If we restrict total forest cover to developing countries
and use multivariate tests to control for all of Smith et al.’s factors (the sample size can
easily accommodate multivariate tests) we find that neither per capita GDP nor
governance have any statistically significant relation to changes in total forest cover,
while HDI is now negatively related to forest cover and barely statistically significant at
the 10% level (Table 1).1

We can reveal the effect of sample selection bias graphically (Figure 1). The graph
reveals two clusters of countries, (1) a relatively large group with low governance scores

1

Data for change in forest cover, corruption, per capita GDP, Human Development Indicators, and

population density are precisely those used by Smith et al. (available online at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v426/n6962/extref/nature02025-s1.pdf). Because we have one
observation per country, we estimate the model using ordinary least squares and correct for
heteroskedasticity.
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and negative changes in forest cover (marked with Xs) and (2) a relatively small group
with high governance scores and positive forest cover change (marked with circles). The
Xs represent developing countries; the circles represent developed countries. The graph
also shows two best fit lines. The thick line is the best fit for developing countries; the
thin line is the best fit for all countries. The slope of line for developing countries is
statistically indistinguishable from the zero-slope line at conventional significance levels.
Thus, the only defensible inference to draw is that forest cover tended to increase in
developed countries and decrease in developing countries between 1990 and 1995. There
are few policy implications from such a result.

Third, the authors correlate the change in forest cover with mean governance score over a
single period. The implications one can draw from such tests are unclear. An average
cannot identify whether conditions are improving, deteriorating, or unchanged, so one
cannot infer that improvements in governance would lead to increased forest cover. A
more policy oriented research design would at least test the change in the stock of a
natural resource on changes of governance, or levels of resource at time (t) and (t+1) on
governance levels at (t) and (t+1). If we revisit Smith et al.’s data changes in forest cover
and in governance, rather than levels, the correlation between the change in governance
and change in forest cover is -0.21, neither positive nor statistically significant. Simple
correlations of levels cannot adequately capture the relationship between biological,
economic, and political factors.
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Smith et al. use similar techniques to analyze the relation between corruption and
populations of African elephants and black rhinoceroses. As in their study of forests,
they test the effects of governance, per capita GDP, mean HDI, and mean population
density, as well as a measure of spending per km2 of protected area within countries, on
changes in African elephant populations. In these tests the authors use stepwise
regression, and find that only mean governance scores for the period 1987 - 1994 explain
the change in these populations. The authors conclude that “These results suggest that
political corruption may play a considerable role in determining the success of national
strategies to conserve these two flagship species, despite the international attention they
both attract” (p.68).

But once again, these results are not robust. For the sake of brevity, we focus here just on
the inferences with respect to African elephants. By adding more data from the same
series to their study, and including the appropriate controls due to their omitted relevant
variables, Smith et al. results change completely.

Data exist for African elephants over three periods from the same data series, the African
Elephant Database 1987 (Burrill & Douglas-Hamilton 1987), 1994 (Said et al. 1995),
1997 (Barnes et al. 1999), and 2002 (Blanc et al. 2003), although Smith et al. only use
two. The numbers Smith et al. use for the 1987 elephant numbers do not correspond to
the African Elephant Database. By email communication, Dr. Smith wrote that he
received new data from someone within the IUCN: Ghana (3,900), Kenya (35,000),
Tanzania (100,000), and Uganda (3,000). It turns out that the correlation between
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change in elephant population and national level corruption is highly sensitive to specific
time periods: the correlation is 0.40 between 1987 and 1997, but changes to -0.32
between 1997 an 2002. And the inclusion of appropriate control variables completely
changes the results. By simply including a country’s latitude changes the results; latitude
in fact better explains change in elephant populations than does the national corruption
measure. Using the Smith et al.’s data, a regression of the change in elephant population
on governance and latitude yields the following equation (p-value in parentheses): change
in elephant = -73.8 (<.01) + 10.1* Governance (0.14) + -2.4*Latitude (<.01); R-squared
= 0.78; N = 20.

Further, the specific features of each specific resource must be considered before trying
to model the relationship between corruption and biodiversity. The set of factors that
account for elephant population change, for example, are highly unlikely to account for
changes in forest cover. In studying elephants we would argue that factors regarding
basic anthropogenic and biophysical factors likely affect to elephant fertility and
mortality should be included. So as a simple check on the Smith et al. study’s robustness,
we regressed the annual growth rate in national elephant population on the natural
logarithm of the lagged elephant population – the coefficient on which then reflects the
effect of a one percent change in base period population on the rate of growth, also
measured in percentage terms – and rainfall, as two basic variables likely to affect
population growth rates. (We estimate the annual average (compound) growth rate in
elephant population between survey periods using the formula POPs+t= (1+r)tPOPs where
t is years between counts, r is the annual growth rate, and s is the initial period. Because
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we would expect forest and savannah elephants to respond differently at the same levels
of rainfall, given the stark difference in their habitats, we use deviations from countryspecific mean average annual rainfall levels as our explanatory variable, from 1987-2002.
Source: Global Historical Climatological Network (2004).)

Since it is obvious that human activity have a great deal to do with elephant numbers, we
employ two anthropogenic factors in our analysis: the presence of civil war, and tourists
per hectare of protected area. The civil war data counts the existence of civil war in a
country (by convention, intrastate conflict with more than a 1000 human deaths)
(Gleditsch & Ward 2004). Tourist data come from the World Bank (2004). Finally, we
include a measure of corruption. Standard measures of corruption, like the ones used by
Smith et al., provide a single, national level of corruption for a country annually. They
employ use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measure (CPI website:
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html). But CPI data does not cover the years
for which they have data on their dependent variables, so they construct their measure of
corruption using another well- measure of corruption, International Country Risk Guide.
These two measures of corruption are highly correlated and widely known. We use the
latter as it covers the entire period under investigation and is thus more precise.

Our hypotheses about these factors and their associated measures are in Table 2. Data for
elephant populations are from all periods covered by the African Elephant Database. We
must add the caution, however, that the editors of the elephant database specifically warn
against empirical studies like Smith et al.’s or the results we now present, because
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contributors to these reports make clear that different counting methods over space and
time were used, making comparisons between counts tenuous.2

With that important caveat in mind, we regress the growth rate of national-level elephant
population on its lagged level and our explanatory variables (Table 3). We estimate the
model using panel data-corrected standard errors since lagged variables are included and
we wish to account for possible heteroskedasticity in the regression errors. The results
suggest that two anthropogenic factors – civil war and tourists per protected area – are
significant predictors of African elephant population change. Civil wars reduce elephant
populations through mortality (more humans with guns in these zones seek meat and
cash) and elephant outmigration. Since no data exist on the actual spatial dispersion of
tourists or on conservation enforcement levels over the sample frame, we use tourists per
protected area as a proxy, since the presence of tourists can increase elephants through
both the informal enforcement effect of tourists, increased government agents in the field
due to tourists, and the incremental revenue tourists provide for conservation activities.

Biophysical factors also matter to elephant population stocks. Population dynamics
appear to be convex over the sample range in that estimated growth rates are positively
and significantly related to the lagged stock level. Stocks are also increasing in rainfall,
2

The sampling error of the most widely used counting protocols – e.g. dung count and aerial surveys – are

also different, and they are also used in different ratios from year to year in different countries. In some
cases, more accurate protocols for counting would lead to a decline in the number of elephants reported,
regardless of other factors (R. Barnes, editor of 1995, 1998, 2002 African Elephant Databases, personal
communication, December 2003).
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which others have attributed to rainfall’s effect on elephant fecundity, infant mortality,
and local labor supply for poaching (Barrett & Arcese 1998). Once we control for these
plausible anthropogenic and biophysical conditioning factors, however, corruption levels
no longer have any explanatory power (and using level rather than the change in elephant
population as the dependent variable yields similar results). This once again underscores
how fragile apparent statistical relationships between measures of central government
corruption and conservation outcomes such as forest cover or the population of a
protected species. Although anecdotal and simple statistical evidence leads observers to
hypothesize about connections between corruption and conservation, without careful and
explicit modeling of the pathways through which such effects might occur, empirical
exercises such as those popularized in recent years are likely to generate fragile, even
misleading results.

Conclusion
There is growing interest in explaining conservation outcomes through political
processes. This is certainly an appropriate direction in which to push research; no
resource is immune from the direct or indirect forces resulting from government policy or
the political process (Ascher 1999). But studies of the links between corruption and
outcomes on the landscape will need more careful modeling and testing than has been the
norm to date. We discussed the many ways that corruption may be linked to
overexploitation, each representing a different causal path from human action to
environmental outcome. And we showed the fragility of simple studies. The links
between national governments and natural resources are many and tangled. Additional
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work attempting to bridge the social and natural sciences is clearly needed to better
explain these important and complex relationships.
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Table 1: Forest cover for all countries and developing countries

Population density
governance
HDI

Forest Cover
(All countries)
[Smith et al.]
-0.000
-0.000
(0.52)
(0.19)
0.232
(7.03)c
1.956
(4.08)c

Forest cover
(Developing countries only)
-0.000
(0.89)

-0.000
(0.42)
0.135
(1.03)

-0.000
(0.49)

-0.000
(0.52)

-1.263
(1.77)a

Per capita GDP

0.000
(6.54)c
-0.954
(8.03)c
93
0.22

Constant

-1.702
-1.930
-1.507
c
c
(9.46)
(6.09)
(3.36)c
Observations
94
88
66
R-squared
0.28
0.12
0.02
Robust t statistics in parentheses
a
significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 1%
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-0.307
(0.82)
60
0.05

0.000
(1.47)
-1.166
(8.31)c
65
0.02

Table 2: Hypotheses, variables, and measures for elephant analysis
Hypotheses
Previous level of elephants to control for
potential nonlinear elephant population
dynamics.
Rainfall affects fecundity/infant mortality
as well as local labor supply for poaching

Civil war increases elephant poaching
Increased conservation enforcement
decreases elephant poaching
Corruption decreases elephants due to
increased, unsustainable (potentially
illegal) offtake.

Measures
Lagged elephant population level, from African
Elephant Database (various years).
Change in three year average of rainfall before
elephant count (elephants have 24 month
gestation). Source: Global Historical
Climatology Network (2004)
Occurrence of civil war in country at time of
count. Source: Gleditsch (2004)
Change in number of tourists per hectare of
protected area. Source: World Bank (2004).
Change in ICRG measure of corruption
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Table 3: Panel-Corrected standard errors model for growth rate
of elephants
Log of lag level of elephants
Civil war
Change in tourists per hectare of
protected area

0.02
(2.26)b
-0.10
(3.95)c
0.03

(2.22)b
Change in rainfall
0.08
(1.74)a
Change in corruption
0.03
(1.19)
Constant
-0.18
(2.39)b
Observations
45
R-Squared (overall)
0.37
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
a
significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 1%
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Figure Legends
The cluster of Xs represents developing countries and the cluster of circles represents
developed countries. The thick line with the relatively flat slope is the best fit line for
developing countries; the thin line with the positive slope is the best fit for all countries.
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